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Tiivistelmä 
Aivovaurio primaarilla näköaivokuorella (V1) aiheuttaa sokeuden siihen osaan 
näkökenttää, jonka prosessoinnista vaurioitunut aivokuoren osa vastaa. Jotkut 
tällaisista primaarin näköaivokuoren vauriosta johtuvasta sokeudesta 
kärsivistä potilaista pystyvät kuitenkin tiedostamattomasti prosessoimaan 
visuaalisia ärsykkeitä, jotka on esitetty sokealle näkökentälle. Tällaista 
prosessointia voidaan mitata esimerkiksi pyytämällä koehenkilö esittämään 
paras arvaus visuaalisen ärsykkeestä, jota hän ei raportoi nähneensä. Mikäli 
vastaustarkkuus on arvaustodennäköisyyttä parempi, voidaan todeta, että 
visuaalinen ärsyke vaikutti henkilön käyttäytymiseen tiedostamattomalla 
tasolla. Tästä ilmiöstä käytetään yleisesti nimeä sokeanäkö. Neurologisilla 
potilailla tehdyistä havainnoista ei kuitenkaan voida suoraan tehdä päätelmiä, 
jotka yleistyisivät koskemaan kaikkia ihmisiä. Potilaiden aivoissa tapahtuu 
plastisiteetin vuoksi muutoksia, jotka voivat selittää näitä säästyneitä 
visuaalisia kykyjä. Transkraniaalisella magneettistimulaatiolla (TMS) voidaan 
tutkia neurologisesti terveiden koehenkilöiden aivojen osien funktioita, sillä 
TMS häiritsee hetkellisesti aivojen normaalia viestinvälitystä. Primaarille 
näköaivokuorelle kohdistetut TMS-pulssit häiritsevät tietoista näkemistä. 
Tässä tutkielmassa selvitin, onko tiedostamaton prosessointi mahdollista, kun 
ärsykkeen tietoista havaintoa on häiritty primaarin näköaivokuoren 
stimulaatiolla. Tutkimuksissamme havaitsimme, että sekä tietoinen että 
tiedostamaton näköinformaation prosessointi vaativat primaarin 
näköaivokuoren toimintaa neurologisesti terveillä. Tiedostamatonta 
näköinformaation prosessointia havaittiin ainoastaan yksinkertaisimmassa 
tehtävässä, jossa koehenkilö reagoi ärsykkeen ilmestymiseen. Silloinkin 
ainoastaan, kun aikaista prosessointia primaarilla näköaivokuorella ei häiritty. 
Liikkeen ja värin prosessointia mittaavissa kokeissa tiedostamatonta 
prosessointia V1-stimulaation aikana ei havaittu. Tiedostamaton 
näköinformaation prosessointi riippuu siis primaarin näköaivokuoren 
toiminnasta neurologisesti terveillä koehenkilöillä. 
Avainsanat: sokeanäkö, primaari näköaivokuori, tiedostamaton prosessointi, 
transkraniaalinen magneettistimulaatio 
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Abstract  
Lesion in primary visual cortex (V1) causes blindness in the visual field that is 
processed by the damaged area. Some patients with V1 lesion can 
unconsciously process the stimuli presented in their blind visual field. This kind 
of processing can be observed, for example, using a paradigm in which a patient 
is required to make a guess about the visual stimulus that he or she reports not 
seeing. If the accuracy of the responses is better than chance, it can be 
interpreted as unconscious processing, which is a measurable effect on 
behavior without conscious perception. This phenomenon of unconscious 
processing without V1 is commonly referred to as blindsight. The findings of 
unconscious processing without V1 in blindsight patients cannot be 
straightforwardly generalized to neurologically healthy people. Neural 
plasticity changes these patients’ brains; therefore, blindsight could be 
explained by these neural changes. Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is 
a method used to study the function of a cortical area in neurologically healthy 
people. With TMS, it is possible to interfere with the normal functioning of the 
brain. TMS of V1 can suppress the conscious perception of a visual stimulus. In 
this thesis, I studied whether the unconscious processing of visual stimuli is 
possible in neurologically healthy participants when the conscious perception 
of the stimulus is suppressed by TMS of V1. I found that both conscious and 
unconscious processing of visual information depend on V1 in neurologically 
healthy participants. Unconscious processing was observed only with the 
simplest task, in which participants responded to stimulus appearance. In this 
task, unconscious processing was observed only when the early activation of V1 
was intact. The unconscious processing of chromaticity and motion was not 
observed when the stimulus was suppressed by TMS of V1. Therefore, I 
conclude that unconscious visual processing depends on V1 in neurologically 
healthy participants. 
Keywords: blindsight, primary visual cortex, unconscious processing, 
transcranial magnetic stimulation
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1 Introduction 
 
Lesion in primary visual cortex (V1, sometimes referred to as striate cortex) causes 
blindness in the visual field that is processed by the damaged area (Holmes, 1918). 
Therefore, patients with V1 lesion cannot consciously perceive anything presented 
in the blind visual field and if you present a visual stimulus to their blind field, they 
deny seeing it. However, it seems that all visual processing does not depend on V1 
like conscious perception does. These visual processes are unconscious, meaning 
that although the patient denies seeing the stimulus, it has a measurable effect on the 
patient’s behavior. In blindsight, a patient has a brain lesion in V1 that causes visual 
field loss, but they can still process the stimuli presented in their blind visual field to 
some extent (Pöppel, Held, & Frost, 1973; Weiskrantz, Warrington, Sanders, & 
Marshall, 1974). The stimulus-driven activation from the primary visual (geniculo-
striate) pathway is absent in blindsight, but these patients still have various residual 
visual capacities. The question therefore is what are the visual pathways in the brain 
that enable these unconscious visual processes in these patients and can unconscious 
processing be found without the functioning of V1 in neurologically healthy people 
as well? In this thesis, I study whether unconscious processing independent of V1 is 
possible in neurologically healthy people or, alternatively, does unconscious 
processing depend on the stimulus-driven activation in V1.  
1.1 Unconscious visual processes 
Visual processes can be either conscious or unconscious if unconscious processing 
is understood simply as a visual process that does not reach consciousness. This 
distinction seems quite straightforward, but determining what processing is 
conscious and what is unconscious is not a trivial task. There is an ongoing debate 
about the nature of visual consciousness and whether there are conscious 
phenomenal experiences that cannot be reported (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; 
Lamme, 2010; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). In practice, the study of consciousness 
 9 
heavily relies on subjective reports about consciousness; therefore, these 
phenomenal unreportable conscious experiences are difficult to grasp in 
experimental science. For that reason, in this thesis, conscious visual processing 
refers to the visual stimulus that the person is aware of and can report seeing.  
 To measure unconscious processing, one must first suppress the conscious 
perception of the stimulus and then measure the effects of the unconscious stimulus 
on behavior. There are multiple ways of interfering with conscious visual processing, 
for example, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) or visual masking. These 
methods will be examined later (chapter 1.3); currently, I focus on measuring 
unconscious processing after the stimulus is suppressed. To ensure that the 
manipulation of the conscious visual experience was successful, one must somehow 
evaluate the conscious experience of the participants. This is achieved by asking the 
participants to report the content of their perception. One method of evaluation is 
asking if the participant saw the presented stimulus or not. However, this method of 
evaluation is based on an assumption that the suppression of conscious perception is 
working in an on–off fashion. Even though in some cases the suppression might be 
so effective that participants are satisfied with two awareness options (Sergent & 
Dehaene, 2004), all cases of conscious perception are not the same (Overgaard, Rote, 
Mouridsen, & Ramsøy, 2006). If the participants perceive the stimulus very weakly, 
they have difficulties in determining whether they saw the stimulus or not. 
Sometimes, the participant perceives features of the stimulus but not those that are 
relevant to the task. For example, when they are asked to report the shape of the 
stimulus, they might see a vague image but they have no idea if the stimulus was a 
square or a triangle. To take into account the fact that conscious perception is likely 
a gradual phenomenon at least in some cases, the four-point perceptional awareness 
scale (PAS) has been used (Overgaard et al., 2006). The participant selects whether 
he or she “did not see,” “saw a weak glimpse,” “saw an almost clear image,” or “saw 
a clear image.” Using PAS gives participants more options to select the description 
of the visual perception that more accurately represents their conscious experience. 
If, however, the suppression would work in a dichotomous manner, the participant 
could still report only “did not see” or “saw a clear image” as in two-point awareness 
scales. Another way to tackle this issue is to use confidence ratings (Sandberg, 
Timmermans, Overgaard, & Cleeremans, 2010), wherein the participants report how 
confident they were about their awareness report and only the trials in which the 
participant reports being confident of not seeing the stimulus are considered 
unconscious. 
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1.1.1 Forced-choice paradigm 
One of the simplest measures of unconscious processing is the performance in a 
forced-choice task when the participant reports that he or she did not see the stimulus. 
If the performance in this task is above chance level, the conclusion is that the 
participant could unconsciously process the stimuli. This paradigm is, however, not 
without its limitations. The participant is required to make a best guess about the 
stimulus that he or she did not perceive. The task feels very counterintuitive to many 
and the participant may realize that the study is measuring unconscious processing. 
Another problem arises when a two-point awareness scale is used. The participants 
might change their response criterion (not deliberately) to the seen/unseen evaluation 
because they feel like they should be certain about their guess when they report that 
they saw something. 
1.1.2 Redundant target effect 
The measure of unconscious processing should optimally not rely on guessing and 
the task should remain the same in both unconscious and conscious processing 
measurements. Redundant target effect (RTE) (sometimes referred to as redundant 
signals effect or bilateral gain) is a phenomenon in which a stimulus that is not 
needed to complete the task affects the performance. More precisely, the task is to 
respond as quickly as possible when a stimulus or stimuli are presented and people 
respond faster to two stimuli than to a single stimulus (Kinchla, 1974; Miller, 1982). 
RTE can be easily employed to measure unconscious processing. The participant is 
instructed to respond to any number of stimuli and report how many stimuli he or 
she saw. The conscious perception of one of the two stimuli is suppressed and then 
the effect of that unconscious stimulus can be measured. If the participant reports 
seeing only one stimulus when two stimuli are actually presented, whether the 
unconscious redundant target speeds up reaction times can be measured. In practice, 
this can be performed by collecting trials in which only one stimulus is presented 
and the participant correctly sees them. Then, the reaction times to those single-
stimulus trials are compared with the reaction times to the trials in which an 
unconscious redundant target was presented in addition to the conscious stimulus. If 
the reaction times are on average faster in the unconscious redundant target trials 
than in the single-stimulus trials, the unconscious redundant target had a measurable 
effect on behavior. 
 Why does the redundant target speed up reaction times? There are two hypotheses 
that explain the (conscious) RTE: race model and neural coactivation model (Miller, 
1982). The race model explains the RTE in pure probabilistic terms. It assumes that 
both the stimuli are capable of producing the response and that there is an internal 
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competition, “a horse race,” between the signals elicited by the two stimuli. The 
signal that pushes over the response threshold faster produces the response. The 
faster of the two signals always wins and therefore faster reaction times are more 
probable. However, in some cases, the race model fails to explain the speed-up and 
the only possible explanation is that the neural coactivation elicits the faster reaction 
times, which means that both signals are contributing to the response. This neural 
coactivation can occur at perceptual, cognitive, or motor levels (Iacoboni & Zaidel, 
2003). Miller (1982) proposed the race model test to determine whether the race 
model hypothesis can explain RTE. He found that the race model could not explain 
the speed-up in his experiment using multimodal (auditory and visual) signals. 
Therefore, the neural coactivation model was the only possible explanation for RTE. 
The race model test is in principle very simple: the reaction-time cumulative 
distribution functions (CDF) in one-stimulus trials are compared with the reaction-
time CDFs in two-stimulus trials. If the cumulative probability of the fast reaction 
times is higher in the two-stimulus trials than in the one-stimulus trials, the race 
model has been violated. This means that the race model cannot explain the RTE and 
that the reaction times in the two-stimulus trials are faster than those that the two 
competing signals could produce. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts, so 
to say. One limitation of the race model test is that if the race model is not violated, 
the explanation can be either the race model or the neural coactivation model. One 
cannot exclude the neural coactivation model just because the race model could 
explain the RTE.  
 Then, what about unconscious RTE? RTE can be found even when the redundant 
target is unconscious (Savazzi & Marzi, 2002; Tamietto et al., 2010). It is safe to 
assume that the unconscious single target does not typically elicit a response. One 
does not react to a stimulus that is not consciously perceived. Thus, it is impossible 
to draw the CDF to the unconscious one-stimulus trials and therefore the typical race 
model test cannot be performed on unconscious RTE data because there is no race. 
Only conscious stimulus elicits the response, but the unconscious redundant target 
speeds up the reaction time of the response. The explanation to unconscious RTE is 
always neural coactivation, unless there is an unconscious single-stimulus trial that 
can elicit the response. One possible way to collect unconscious single-stimulus 
trials could be to measure eye movements because they are more automatic than 
manual responses. The RTE has clear advantages over forced-choice as a measure 
of unconscious processing; therefore, across all three studies, we employed the RTE 
as a measure of unconscious processing. 
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1.1.3 Unconscious visual processing in the brain 
What happens in the brain during unconscious visual processing? Here I discuss the 
two different explanations to answer this question: the anatomical explanation and 
the physiological explanation. By physiological explanation, I mean that the same 
visual processing areas contribute to both conscious and unconscious processes but 
the timing and connectivity within time-windows might differ. By anatomical 
explanation, I mean that the unconscious information is processed in different brain 
areas or that the information is carried through different pathways from the conscious 
information.  
 Anatomical models explain unconscious processing based on the differentiated 
pathways for unconscious and conscious processes. Figure 1 schematizes these 
pathwaysFigure 2. The primary visual pathway has been extensively studied and it 
goes from the retina to the parvocellular and magnocellular layers of the lateral 
geniculate nucleus (LGN) and then connects to V1. This visual pathway is critical to 
visual consciousness, and a lesion of V1 (Holmes, 1918) or this pathway (Marzi, 
Mancini, Metitieri, & Savazzi, 2006) causes blindness. V1 is organized such that a 
specific part of a visual field is processed in a specific part of V1. A retinotopic map 
(Figure 2) represents the mapping between the spatial visual input and the 
corresponding part of the visual cortex processing it. It is acquired using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (Henriksson, Karvonen, Salminen-Vaparanta, 
Railo, & Vanni, 2012; Vanni, Henriksson, & James, 2005). V1 is located in the 
calcarine sulcus that is in occipital cortex (Hinds et al., 2008). The left hemisphere 
processes the right visual field and vice versa. The upper bank of the calcarine sulcus 
Figure 1. Schematic of the geniculo-striate pathway and the subcortical pathways that bypass V1. A) 
Geniculo-striate pathway. Red arrows represent the feedforward sweep from the eye via the lateral 
geniculate nucleus of the thalamus to V1. From V1, the feedforward sweep activates higher visual 
processing areas and recurrent activation takes place (blue arrow). B) V1-bypassing pathways from the 
superior colliculus, LGN, and pulvinar to the extrastriate and parietal areas. 
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processes the lower visual field and the lower bank processes the upper visual field. 
Therefore, for example, the lower left visual field is processed in the upper bank of 
the calcarine sulcus in the right hemisphere. The information is passed from V1 to 
the adjacent visual processing areas V2, V3 and V3a and to V4, which processes 
mostly chromatic signals, and to V5, which processes mostly motion. Rapidly (and 
partially simultaneously) after the feedforward sweep, the recurrent circuits activate. 
The exact mechanism of how this information through the geniculo-striate pathway 
gives rise to the conscious experience is debated (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; 
Lamme, 2010; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). However, the importance of V1 and the 
geniculo-striate pathway in conscious visual perception is not denied. 
 Besides the geniculo-striate pathway, multiple other connections from subcortical 
areas to extrastriate cortex and parietal areas do not go through V1. An extremely 
connected area is the pulvinar, which is connected to the superior colliculus (SC) 
and visual cortical areas V1, V2, V3, V3a, V4, and V5 as well as parietal areas (Leh, 
Chakravarty, & Ptito, 2008). LGN also directly connects to other visual cortical areas 
besides V1, such as V2 (Fries, 1981) and V5 (Gaglianese et al., 2015). The most 
widely acknowledged of these pathways is probably the retinotectal pathway that 
connects the SC via the pulvinar to extrastriate areas. Unfortunately, the role of these 
pathways in unconscious processing is difficult to study in humans. The activation 
of these subcortical structures can be evaluated using fMRI, but the activation in 
these pathways can reflect either feedforward or feedback activation. Sumner, 
Adamjee, and Mollon (2002) proposed a simple behavioral task to examine the role 
of the SC: if an effect is not found using S-cone isolating short-wavelength stimuli, 
the tract from the superior colliculus explains the effect. This assumption is based on 
the primate studies that have suggested that SC does not activate in response to short-
wavelength stimuli (de Monasterio, 1978; Marrocco & Li, 1977; Schiller & Malpeli, 
1977). However, this method of studying collicular contribution has recently been 
Figure 2. Functional magnetic resonance images of the visual cortex. Eccentricity map shows in 
same color the activation that is caused by stimuli that are presented at the same distance away 
from the fovea. There were no stimuli presented to the fovea in the sequence; therefore, the foveal 
activation is missing from the figure. Polar angle map shows the angle from the fovea at which the 
stimulus was presented. 
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challenged. S-cone isolating stimuli can elicit express saccades that are triggered by 
SC (Hall & Colby, 2016), and SC shows activation in response to short-wavelength 
stimuli (Hall & Colby, 2014). Despite these findings that challenge the validity of 
the short-wavelength stimuli as a way to study the function of the SC, interesting 
dissociations are found in unconscious processing between short- and long-
wavelength stimuli (Savazzi & Marzi, 2004; Tamietto et al., 2010).  
 In contrast to the presented anatomical models, physiological models explain the 
differences between conscious and unconscious visual processing by stating that V1 
is involved in both processes but within different temporal stages. An example of the 
physiological model explaining unconscious processing is Lamme’s theory (Lamme, 
2004, 2010; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). Lamme argues that information flowing 
from V1 to extrastriate areas is capable of producing unconscious processing. This 
unidirectional information flow is called the feedforward sweep, and rapidly after 
that, recurrent activation takes place. According to Lamme, the recurrent activation 
between extrastriate areas and V1 gives rise to conscious experience. This means 
that V1 serves as a relay station during the unconscious feedforward time-window 
and contributes to the conscious visual perception during the recurrent activation 
time-window. The global neuronal workspace model predicts similar outcomes for 
feedforward information (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006). 
Feedforward stimulus-driven activation could cause unconscious processing; 
however, if it is not connected to the parieto-frontal global workspace, it does not 
become conscious. Both of the physiological models presented here assume that the 
feedforward sweep is unconscious but can influence behavior. Therefore, conscious 
perception could be suppressed and unconscious processing could be observed as 
long as the feedforward activation is not disrupted. 
 Note that the anatomical and physiological models do not exclude one another. It 
is likely that some of the unconscious processes are caused by the subcortical 
pathways connecting to the extrastriatal areas that bypass V1 but other types of 
unconscious processes depend on the feedforward processing (and some even on 
recurrent processing) in V1. Also, the distinction that the information is not 
conscious is not sufficient to draw general conclusions about the processes in the 
brain. Multiple processing phases contribute to conscious vision; therefore, multiple 
processes can be disrupted to suppress conscious vision. One should figure out why 
the information is unconscious and during what processing phase was the processing 
disrupted. If the conscious vision is absent owing to damage in retina, we should 
anticipate different (unconscious) activations and processes than if the conscious 
vision was absent owing to V1 lesion. 
 15 
1.2 Blindsight 
Unconscious visual processing without the functioning of V1 has been demonstrated 
in the clinical cases of blindsight. Blindsight refers to the phenomenon in which a 
neurological patient who has a blind visual hemifield owing to V1 lesion can still 
unconsciously process stimuli presented in the blind visual field (Pöppel et al., 1973; 
Weiskrantz et al., 1974). Blindsight patients are able to, for example, discriminate 
colors (Brent, Kennard, & Ruddock, 1994; Stoerig & Cowey, 1989, 1992), speed up 
reaction times (Tamietto et al., 2010; Tomaiuolo, Ptito, Marzi, Paus, & Ptito, 1997), 
and discriminate the direction of the motion stimulus (Ffytce & Zeki, 1998) based 
on the stimuli that they report not being aware of. These findings suggest that visual 
information can affect the blindsight patients’ behavior via pathways that do not 
depend on V1. 
 The term “blindsight” was coined by Lawrence Weiskrantz after he found the 
above chance discrimination performance in the blind visual field in some V1 
lesioned patients (Weiskrantz et al., 1974). Even though “blindsight” is a catchy (and 
commonly used) expression, it is slightly misleading. To speak of these residual 
capacities as “sight” is very much an exaggeration. If a person with normal sight 
would, for example, discriminate vertical bars from horizontal ones at 70% accuracy, 
this would be a demonstration of difficulties in the task, whereas in blindsight, this 
would be phenomenal performance. A more accurate description of blindsight could 
be the residual unconscious visual capacities in the absence of V1. 
 Dankert and Rosetti (2005) highlighted the differences of these residual abilities 
and the respective neural pathways enabling these abilities in their review on 
blindsight studies. They created taxonomy of three types of blindsight: action-
blindsight, attention-blindsight, and agnosopsia. Action-blindsight refers to the 
ability to guide motor responses based on the stimuli presented in the blind field. The 
enabling residual pathway is connected from SC to pulvinar and from there to 
posterior parietal cortex. Attention blindsight is manifested when unconscious 
stimulus captures patient’s attention or elicits a sensation or feeling of a stimulus that 
lacks visual properties. This might sound self-contradictory; what does a visual 
sensation that lacks visual properties look like? One example of this is Riddoch’s 
syndrome, in which a patient can perceive the motion in his or her blind field but not 
the visual stimulus itself (Riddoch, 1917). One patient with Riddoch’s syndrome 
described the experience as “a black shadow moving on a black background” and 
that “shadow is the nearest I can get to putting it into words so that people can 
understand” (Ffytce & Zeki, 1998). These not fully unaware unconscious blindsight 
processes are sometimes referred to as Type 2 blindsight, whereas the in-absence-
of-awareness blindsight is called Type 1 blindsight. The Type 2 blindsight, or 
attention blindsight as Dankert and Rosetti call it, is assumed to be caused by the 
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information from the SC–pulvinar–extrastriate cortex pathway. The last category in 
Dankert and Rosetti’s taxonomy is agnosopsia, the term coined by Zeki and Ffytche 
(1998) that means literally “to not know what one sees.” This form of blindsight is 
most likely in action when making a correct forced-choice guess about the properties 
of the stimulus presented in the blind visual field. This kind of processing is 
attributed to the pathway connecting the interlaminal layers of the lateral geniculate 
nucleus (LGN) to the extrastriate areas. This three-fold taxonomy is a great reminder 
that even though blindsight might seem like a single phenomenon, there might be 
multiple underlying explanations to its residual capacities. Therefore, the researchers 
who claim in their article that they have found an explanation for blindsight in 
general (e.g., Schmid et al., 2010) may have in fact found an explanation for just one 
type of blindsight. 
 This thesis is focused on the motor responses affected by the unconscious visual 
processing that does not depend on V1; therefore, the most relevant blindsight 
findings are those of action blindsight. Unconscious RTE, which is a great example 
of unconscious action, has been employed in the study of blindsight since the early 
years of blindsight studies (Marzi, Tassinari, Aglioti, & Lutzemberger, 1986). Some, 
but not all, of the patients showed RTE when the redundant target was presented in 
their blind visual field. This finding was later replicated in two blindsight patients 
(Tomaiuolo et al., 1997). Conclusive evidence for the neural mechanism of this 
speed-up has not been found. Savazzi and Marzi (2004) found in neurologically 
healthy participants that (conscious) RTE with red, gray, and white stimuli violated 
the race model, but RTE in purple stimuli could be explained by the race model. 
They concluded that the activation of SC is needed for interhemispheric summation, 
that is, in Miller’s terms, neural coactivation. Tamietto et al. (2010) hypothesized 
that the most probable explanation for unconscious RTE after V1 lesion is the 
information carried by the retinotectal tract; therefore, they employed the short-
wavelength stimulus to study the contribution of the SC. They presented one 
stimulus to the normal visual field and sometimes a redundant stimulus to the blind 
visual field. Blindsight measured as RTE was found with gray and red stimuli but 
not with purple stimuli. They also found fMRI activation in the SC in response to 
gray stimuli but not to purple stimuli. Unfortunately, they did not measure activation 
in response to red stimuli so that the difference in fMRI might be explained by 
chromatic versus achromatic information processing. However, two 
hemispherectomized patients who have no other intact ipsilateral subcortical visual 
structures than the SC showed RTE as well (Georgy, Celeghin, Marzi, Tamietto, & 
Ptito, 2016). Therefore, the contribution of SC seems to be the most prominent 
explanation of blindsight measured as RTE.  
 The problem with blindsight studies is that the findings are not straightforwardly 
generalizable to healthy population. Neural plasticity can play a crucial role in 
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explaining the residual abilities in blindsight patients. After V1 lesion, new 
connections are formed and the existing connections change their functions in the 
patients’ brain (Leh, Johansen-Berg, & Ptito, 2006; Mikellidou et al., 2017; Payne 
& Lomber, 2001). Neurological patients with blindsight (measured as RTE) have 
functional connections from the V1-lesion-sided SC to the ipsilateral and 
contralateral extrastriatal areas (Leh et al., 2006) and from LGN to V5 (Ajina, 
Pestilli, Rokem, Kennard, & Bridge, 2015), whereas patients with no blindsight do 
not have these connections. 
1.3 Methods for suppressing conscious vision in 
neurologically healthy people 
To study unconscious processing in normal brain, it is necessary to suppress the 
conscious perception of the target stimulus. Here I present two methods for 
suppressing conscious vision, both used in the original studies: metacontrast 
masking and TMS. In addition to these, there are other methods to interfere with 
conscious perception, but they fall outside the topic of this thesis and therefore are 
not discussed here. 
1.3.1 Metacontrast masking 
Visual masking paradigms are powerful methods to suppress the conscious 
perception of the stimulus. Metacontrast masking refers to a specific type of visual 
masking, and it has been proven to be effective way to interfere with conscious 
perception (Breitmeyer, Ogmen, & Chen, 2004; Breitmeyer, Ro, Öǧmen, & Todd, 
2007). Metacontrast mask is an additional visual stimulus that is presented after the 
target stimulus, and the mask stimulus does not overlap with the target stimulus. The 
masking effect as a function stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) typically shows a U-
shaped function. Stimulus is not suppressed with very short or long SOAs; however, 
with intermediate SOAs, the masking effect peaks. The problem with visual masking 
is that it is difficult to evaluate the mechanisms that enable the mask to suppress 
conscious perception. One interpretation is that the mask interferes with the recurrent 
processing of the target stimulus and therefore conscious perception is suppressed 
(Lamme, Zipser, & Spekreijse, 2002), whereas others claim that the mask interferes 
with the feedforward processes (Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 2007).  
 Unconscious processing of visual information is possible when the conscious 
perception of the visual stimulus is suppressed using metacontrast masking 
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(Breitmeyer et al., 2004, 2007; Railo & Koivisto, 2012). This implies that methods 
to selectively interfere with the conscious processing while leaving unconscious 
processing intact exist. In our Studies II and III, we used metacontrast masking to 
demonstrate that unconscious processing is possible with the selected stimuli.  
1.3.2 Transcranial magnetic stimulation of V1 
The causal role of a targeted brain region in a task can be studied using TMS. A 
transcranial magnetic stimulator comprises a stimulator unit that stores and delivers 
the electric current and a coil that is placed over the targeted brain area. When electric 
current is conducted through the coil, a magnetic field is generated. This magnetic 
field easily passes through the skull and induces electric current in the brain (Steven 
& Pascual-Leone, 2006). The induced electric current is the strongest in the brain 
area that is directly under the coil, but the nearby areas are also affected, albeit to a 
lesser degree (Jahanshahi & Rothwell, 2000). How focal the stimulation is depends 
on the shape of the stimulation coil. The coil that is most frequently used in early 
TMS studies is a circular coil, which has no focal point. The induced electric current 
is the same along the coil. A circular coil is typically used when the goal is to 
stimulate a relative large area, a few square centimeters, in the brain. When more 
focal stimulation is needed, the figure-of-eight (also known as a butterfly coil) is the 
correct choice. The strongest electric field in the figure-of-eight coil is induced in 
the few-millimeter focal point that is in the middle of the coil, where the two circular 
coil sections intersect. The figure-of-eight coil has a clear advantage over the circular 
coil: the ability to selectively stimulate a very small area in the brain. 
 TMS of the early visual cortex (V1 and surrounding areas) can suppress the 
conscious perception of the stimulus (Amassian et al., 1988; de Graaf, Koivisto, 
Jacobs, & Sack, 2014). The classical (referring to the early findings of Amassian et 
al. (1988)) and most systematic suppressive effect is found when TMS is applied 
around 100 ms after the stimulus onset; however, there is a wide range of occipital 
TMS masking studies reporting suppressive effects from 30 ms before the stimulus 
onset to 200 ms after the stimulus onset (de Graaf et al., 2014). These findings index 
the same that lesion studies have found earlier: V1 plays an important role in 
conscious visual processing.  
1.4 TMS-induced blindsight 
TMS-induced blindsight refers to a phenomenon in which TMS of V1 suppresses 
conscious perception but the participant has some residual visual capacities, just like 
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the blindsight patients. After the ability to interfere with V1 activity using TMS was 
found, it was a natural step to try to replicate blindsight (V1-independent 
unconscious processing) in neurologically healthy observers. For the most part, 
studies have not found V1-independent unconscious processing in the neurologically 
healthy using various stimulus types, but some studies report TMS-induced 
blindsight. Because our hypotheses are largely based on these limited number of 
studies (besides those on blindsight), a detailed overview of the studies is presented 
here. First, I will present the studies that have found unconscious processing when 
the conscious perception of the stimulus was suppressed using TMS of V1. Next, I 
will present the studies that have concluded that both conscious and unconscious 
processing depend on V1. 
 Ro, Shelton, Lee, and Chang (2004) were the first to examine TMS-induced 
blindsight. They found that TMS-suppressed unconscious foveal distractor stimulus 
affected the response times in a task, wherein participants indicated whether the 
target stimulus was presented to the left or right visual field. Interestingly, the 
distractor effect was found only when the task was to perform a saccadic eye 
movement toward the stimulus and not when the task was performed by pressing a 
button. Ro (2008) later found that using a similar distractor paradigm, it was possible 
to affect reaction times in a reaching task as well. Moreover, Christensen, 
Kristiansen, Rowe, and Nielsen (2008) conducted an experiment in which the 
participant was instructed to reach towards a stimulus. They found that the 
participants corrected their reaching motion toward a stimulus because of an 
unconscious TMS-suppressed distractor stimulus. These examples are 
manifestations of TMS-induced action blindsight, but TMS-induced blindsight has 
been found even with more complex stimulus types. V1-independent unconscious 
processing of location, orientation, and color discrimination has been reported in few 
studies. Boyer, Harrison, and Ro (2005) found unconscious processing of color and 
orientation in a forced-choice task. Allen, Sumner, and Chambers (2014) used arrow 
stimuli pointing either to the right or left and the participants could unconsciously 
discriminate them even when V1 was stimulated. They found the effect using both 
S-cone isolating and luminance stimuli. Railo and Koivisto (2012) reported that 
participants could unconsciously discriminate the location of the TMS-suppressed 
stimulus that was presented either to the left or right visual field. Besides these more 
fundamental stimulus types, there are two studies reporting TMS-induced affective 
blindsight, which is the unconscious processing of the emotional content of the TMS-
suppressed stimulus. Jolij and Lamme (2005) found that the accuracy in determining 
the location of an emoticon with non-neutral expression was affected by TMS of V1, 
but the accuracy was not affected to the same degree when the participants reported 
the emotional content. Filmer and Monsell (2013) reported that the classification 
 20 
accuracy of emotional body postures were less affected by TMS of V1 than by 
similar neutral postures. 
 Even though the abovementioned studies have found V1-independent 
unconscious processing, many studies have concluded that both conscious and 
unconscious processing depend on V1. Some of these studies have concluded that at 
some SOAs, it is possible to selectively interfere with conscious processing and 
reveal unconscious processing. This, however, does not constitute as TMS-induced 
blindsight because unconscious processing was disrupted at some other SOA. 
Unconscious visual processing in that case depends on V1 but not in same time-
windows as conscious processing does. Sack, van der Mark Schuhmann, 
Schwarzbach, and Goebel (2009) found that when the accuracy of detecting the 
prime stimulus was lower owing to TMS of V1, the priming effect was also impaired. 
Koivisto, Mäntylä, and Silvanto (2010) studied the role of V1 in motion processing. 
They used a set of dots coherently moving either to the right or to the left. TMS of 
V1 impaired both the forced-choice accuracy and the awareness of the motion. 
Koivisto, Railo, and Salminen-Vaparanta (2011) studied the processing of the 
orientation of a bar and pointing arrows and found that both conscious and 
unconscious processing depended on V1. When the participants reported not being 
aware of the stimulus, they performed at chance level in the forced-choice task. 
Koivisto, Henriksson, Revonsuo, and Railo (2012) studied the role of V1 in 
unconscious priming. The prime was an arrow pointing to the left or to the right, and 
the target stimulus, which also served as a visual mask, was an arrow-shaped 
contour. The priming effect was found even though the participants saw only the 
target arrow. However, TMS of V1 impaired this unconscious priming effect. Persuh 
and Ro (2013) also studied unconscious priming. They found that unconscious 
priming depended on V1 at SOAs ranging from 5 to 25 ms and 65 to 125 ms and 
found unconscious priming at 45 ms SOA. They concluded that unconscious priming 
depends on V1 in specific temporal phases of processing. Koivisto, Lähteenmäki, 
Kaasinen, Parkkola, and Railo (2014) reported that TMS of V1 impaired conscious 
and unconscious shape discrimination. Railo, Salminen-Vaparanta, Henriksson, 
Revonsuo, and Koivisto (2012) studied the unconscious processing of color using 
the unconscious priming paradigm. They found that unconscious color priming was 
impaired by TMS of V1. Railo, Andersson, Kaasinen, Laine, and Koivisto (2014) 
studied the role of V1 in chromatic RTE. TMS of V1 suppressed the perception of 
the redundant chromatic stimulus and eliminated RTE. 
 As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the study of TMS-induced 
blindsight seems to be bipartite. There are research groups that are convinced that 
unconscious processing does not depend on V1, whereas some think that both 
conscious and unconscious processing depend on V1. The studies that have found 
unconscious processing have either used two-point awareness scales or long TMS 
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SOAs. A two-point awareness (seen/unseen) scale can lead to false positive findings 
as participants are not necessary fully unaware of the stimulus when they report not 
seeing using the two-point scale. Long TMS SOAs, on the contrary, might allow the 
feedforward sweep to pass, disrupting only recurrent activation and conscious 
processing. Therefore, the unconscious processing that has been found in these 
studies would not be independent of V1, but the processing can be explained by the 
early feedforward activation from V1. The studies that have concluded that 
unconscious processing depends on V1 have their limitations. As seen with 
blindsight patients, the stimulus and task characteristics play a critical role in 
unconscious processing without V1. Thus, one should examine multiple visual 
processes with different stimuli before concluding that unconscious processing in 
general depends on V1. 
1.5 Aims 
The main aim of the present thesis was to examine whether unconscious processing 
measured as RTE is possible without the intact functioning of V1 (i.e., whether the 
information carried via the subcortical pathways is sufficient for unconscious 
processing). The secondary aim was to investigate whether unconscious processing 
would depend on V1 in a specific time-window whereas conscious processing could 
be suppressed with multiple SOAs. The reasoning behind this is that because the 
feedforward sweep could produce unconscious processing, TMS applied at long 
SOAs could selectively disrupt conscious processing while allowing unconscious 
processing to remain unaffected. In Studies I, II, and III, we used different stimuli 
types to measure different visual processes and to unveil the residual visual 
capacities after TMS was used to interfere with the functioning of V1. The stimuli 
were achromatic (Study I), motion (Study II), and chromatic (Study III). These 
stimulus types were selected because their processing reflects the residual capacities 
found in blindsight patients.  
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2 Overview of the studies 
The studies were designed to explore “TMS-induced action blindsight” using three 
different stimuli types and therefore examine three different visual processes. We 
wanted to ensure that the differences between the unconscious processing of the 
stimulus types were not attributable to the experiments themselves. Therefore, we 
used similar paradigm in all three studies. Figure 3 schematizes the experimental 
trial used in the experiments. All studies employed RTE as a measure of unconscious 
processing. In other words, unconscious processing was operationalized as the 
speeding up of the reaction times in the trials wherein an unconscious redundant 
target was presented. The participants were instructed to press a gamepad button 
Figure 3. Schematic of an experimental trial used in all three studies. The stimuli and the method to 
manipulate conscious vision varied across studies. Roman numerals represent the studies in order of 
publication. 
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immediately when they saw an achromatic stimulus (Study I), a motion (Study II), 
or a chromatic stimulus (Study III). After the reaction task, they were asked how 
many stimuli (Studies I and II) or chromatic stimuli (Study III) they saw and how 
confident they were about that number response. Across studies, we used TMS of 
V1 to suppress the conscious perception of one of the stimuli. In Studies II and III, 
we also conducted a control experiment in which conscious perception was 
suppressed using metacontrast masking.  
 Some of the effects of TMS are not related to neuronal modulation and need to 
be controlled. These effects are loud clicking noise and tactile feedback on the scalp. 
These additional response cues can influence the behavior of the participant; 
therefore, we needed an active control condition. Thus, we had to include trials in 
which participants were presented with one stimulus and received TMS that did not 
affect their conscious perception. Typically, vertex stimulation has been used as a 
control condition; however, with vertex simulation, the participant can easily 
identify the experimental and control conditions. In our experiments, TMS was 
always targeted to the visual cortex. This allowed us to include the experimental (two 
stimuli, one of them unconscious) and control trials (one conscious stimulus) within 
the same blocks. In Studies I and II, we were able to include conscious baseline (two 
conscious stimuli) trials within the same block as the experimental and control trials 
because the stimuli were sometimes presented to the unaffected upper visual field. 
Because this option was unavailable in Study III (see section 2.3, Study III), in which 
Figure 4. Main findings of the studies. Dots represent the effect of the conscious redundant stimulus, 
and triangles represent the effect of an unconscious redundant target on reaction times (i.e., RTE). 
Error bars represent bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. A) In Study I, we found RTE in 
conscious baseline conditions but unconscious conditions only at 90-ms TMS SOA. B) In Study II, we 
found conscious RTE with motion stimuli at all SOAs but did not observe any unconscious RTE. C) 
In Study III, we found conscious RTE with both colors but did not observe unconscious RTE. 
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we always had bilateral stimuli in the lower visual field, conscious baseline RTE was 
acquired while participants received TMS that affected their upper visual field.  
 In all studies, the reaction time data was analyzed using single-trial-based mixed-
effects modeling instead of the more traditional ANOVAs that are based on 
aggregated data. In mixed-effects models, some variables are fixed, that is, the effect 
is a fixed constant across the data. Besides the fixed factors, random factors can be 
added, which allow the slope or the intercept of the model to vary between cases. In 
our studies, random factors were used to control participant-wise variation in 
reaction times. I will now present an overview of these studies in the order of their 
publication date. The main findings of the three studies are presented in Figure 4. 
2.1 Study I 
Hurme, M., Koivisto, M., Revonsuo, A., & Railo, H. (2017). Early processing in 
primary visual cortex is necessary for conscious and unconscious vision while late 
processing is necessary only for conscious vision in neurologically healthy humans. 
NeuroImage, 150, 230-238. 
 
In Study I, we examined whether the simplest form of unconscious processing, the 
processing of an achromatic stimulus appearance, could be found without the 
contribution of V1. Tamietto et al. (2010) found unconscious RTE using achromatic 
stimuli in a blindsight patient. In light of this, we designed an experiment to study 
unconscious RTE caused by achromatic stimuli in neurologically healthy people. We 
used TMS of V1 to suppress conscious perception of the redundant stimulus. We 
wanted to also take into account Lamme’s (2010) theory explaining unconscious 
processing. We assumed that the classical TMS suppressing effect around 100 ms 
SOA might actually have two separate processes within it: the feedforward activation 
from V1 and early recurrent activation. The 60 ms SOA was selected to represent 
the feedforward activation because that is approximately the time required for the 
visual input from the retina to reach V1 (Wilson, Babb, Halgren, & Crandall, 1983). 
The 90 ms SOA was selected to represent early recurrent activation because it has 
been effective in suppressing conscious vision (de Graaf et al., 2014) and recurrent 
activation begins rapidly after the feedforward activation (Boehler, Schoenfeld, 
Heinze, & Hopf, 2008). 
 In Study I, TMS at both 60 and 90 ms SOAs was capable of suppressing conscious 
perception of the redundant stimulus. However, we found unconscious RTE only at 
90 ms SOA and not at 60 ms SOA. Our mixed-effect model showed that the 
unconscious redundant target did not speed up reaction times across the SOAs but at 
90 ms SOA, the reaction times were on average approximately 9 ms faster than those 
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in the single-stimulus condition. This indicates that conscious and unconscious 
processing depend on the feedforward activity in V1, whereas TMS at 90ms 
selectively interferes with conscious processing. The results of Study I indicated that 
the subcortical tracts are not sufficient for unconscious processing in the 
neurologically healthy even when very simple stimuli were used. Unconscious RTE 
depended on the feedforward activity in V1. We concluded that because the simple 
stimuli could not produce unconscious processing, it is unlikely that more complex 
features such as shape or orientation could be processed unconsciously without the 
contribution of V1. 
2.2 Study II 
Hurme, M., Koivisto, M., Revonsuo, A., & Railo, H. (2019). V1 activity during 
feedforward and early feedback processing is necessary for both conscious and 
unconscious motion perception. NeuroImage, 185, 313-321. 
 
The motivation for Study II was two-fold. First, unconscious motion processing is a 
phenomenon commonly found in blindsight patients and is therefore a promising 
way to demonstrate V1-independent unconscious processing. Motion could be 
unconsciously processed in V5 that receives direct inputs form subcortical structures 
(Ffytce & Zeki, 1998). Second, we wanted to revisit our finding in Study I regarding 
the dissociation between feedforward and early recurrent activations in conscious 
and unconscious processing and test whether this also applies to the unconscious 
processing of motion. In Study II, TMS was applied at four different SOAs. Two of 
the SOAs (45 and 60 ms) targeted feedforward activation. We again estimated that 
the 60 ms SOA would most likely reflect the feedforward activation, but we also 
included 45 ms SOA to ensure that we could suppress any earlier signals in V1. 
Recurrent activation (90 and 105 ms SOAs) was targeted again with 90 ms SOA, but 
105 ms SOA was also added to interfere with slightly later recurrent activation and 
to minimize the effect on feedforward signals. The task in Study II was to respond 
as fast as possible when motion stimuli were presented but to not respond when 
stationary stimuli were presented.  
 Perception of the redundant motion stimulus was suppressed at all SOAs. When 
conscious perception of the redundant motion stimulus was suppressed, RTE was 
also absent, suggesting that both feedforward and recurrent time-window activations 
are needed for the unconscious processing of motion. However, we were uncertain 
whether our experimental paradigm was capable of revealing unconscious 
processing at all; therefore, we measured unconscious RTE when the redundant 
target was suppressed using a metacontrast mask. Masked unconscious redundant 
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target produced RTE. The mixed-effect model showed 18 ms faster reaction times 
when unconscious masked redundant target was presented compared with the trials 
in which only one stimulus was presented. 
2.3 Study III 
Hurme, M., Koivisto, M., Henriksson, L., & Railo, H. (in press). Neuronavigated 
TMS of early visual cortex eliminates unconscious processing of chromatic stimuli, 
Neuropsychologia, 136, 107266 
 
In Study III, we examined the unconscious processing of chromatic information. The 
study was designed to fix the methodological issues in the study by Railo et al. (2014) 
and to revisit the idea that there might be differences in the unconscious processing 
of different wavelength stimuli. Railo et al. (2014) used rapidly flickering luminance 
masking to ensure that the participants could only rely on chromatic information in 
the RTE task. The participants were presented with a strong attention-capturing mask 
and then a weak TMS-suppressed chromatic stimulus. We assumed that the 
luminance mask could have interfered with the participants’ ability to unconsciously 
process the chromatic targets. It is impossible to produce a long-lasting, unconscious 
luminance mask with TMS because the strength of TMS suppression is limited. The 
assumption that unconscious processing in general was not possible because of 
luminance masking is impossible to verify because luminance-masked stimulus 
cannot be suppressed using metacontrast masking. With this limitation in mind, we 
changed the paradigm in Study III to make the luminance mask unnecessary. Unlike 
in the traditional RTE paradigm, in Study III, the participants were always presented 
with bilateral luminance-matched stimuli, but they were instructed to respond only 
if they see a chromatic stimulus. We compared two stimulus colors: short wavelength 
(blue) and long wavelength (red). The two stimulus colors were selected to test 
whether retinotectal tract (pathway via SC) could explain unconscious processing. 
This comparison of the two colors as a way to unveil collicular contribution was 
based on the assumption that the retinotectal tract cannot transmit the signals elicited 
by short wavelength stimuli (Sumner et al., 2002). To control non-neuronal effects, 
we compared the trials in which two chromatic stimuli were presented, one of them 
suppressed, with the trials where one chromatic stimulus was presented and the 
perception of one achromatic stimulus was disturbed. The task was to respond as fast 
as possible when the participant saw color. We used two methods to suppress the 
conscious perception of the redundant chromatic stimulus in two different 
experiments: metacontrast masking and TMS of V1. In Experiment 1 of Study III, 
the redundant chromatic stimulus was suppressed with a metacontrast mask that was 
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presented 40 ms after stimulus onset. In Experiment 2 of Study III, the redundant 
stimulus was suppressed by TMS of V1 at 90 ms SOA.  
 In Experiment 1, we found unconscious RTE in both stimulus colors. Therefore, 
metacontrast masking selectively interfered with the conscious perception of the 
redundant stimulus and unconscious processing was observed. In Experiment 2, the 
TMS of V1 eliminated both conscious and unconscious processing of the chromatic 
stimulus. In both experiments, we found no dissociation between short and long 
wavelength colors. This supports our conclusion that the retinotectal tract is not 
sufficient for the unconscious processing of visual stimuli in intact brain. 
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3  Discussion 
In this thesis, I studied the role of V1 in unconscious visual processing in 
neurologically healthy observers. In this chapter, I will discuss the findings of the 
three studies presented in this thesis and how they relate to the previous studies on 
this topic. I will provide also my view on the future directions for research on 
unconscious visual processing and TMS-induced blindsight as well as some ideas 
for blindsight experiments. 
3.1 Unconscious visual processing depends on V1 
The main finding in the three presented studies is that the unconscious processing of 
visual stimuli depends on V1. We further investigated the classical TMS suppression 
“dip” around 100 ms after stimulus onset. We found dissociation between early and 
late V1 processing only in Study I. In Study I, early TMS at 60 ms SOA interfered 
with conscious and unconscious processing but late TMS at 90 ms SOA only 
interfered with conscious processing, as revealed by unconscious RTE. In Study II, 
both early (45 and 60 ms) and late (90 and 105 ms) TMS interfered with both the 
conscious and unconscious processing of motion. In Study III, wherein we 
investigated the unconscious processing of chromatic stimuli, we used only late TMS 
(90 ms). The SOA was selected because it had been the most effective in suppressing 
conscious processing in Studies I and II. TMS at 90 ms SOA interfered with both 
conscious and unconscious processing of chromatic stimuli. 
 Why unconscious processing was found when late processing was suppressed 
using TMS of V1 in Study I but not in Studies II and III? In Study I, we used the 
simplest stimulus and task possible. The stimulus was an achromatic dot and the task 
was to press a button when the stimulus appeared. In Studies II and III, we used a 
modified version of the RTE task that included inhibition to press the button when 
task-irrelevant stimulus appeared. In Study II, participants responded only to motion 
stimuli but were instructed to not press the button when stationary stimulus was 
presented. In Study III, participants were always presented with two luminance-
matched stimuli but were instructed to press the button only when they saw 
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chromatic stimulus. The tasks used in the studies, despite all being RTE tasks, were 
therefore quite different from each other. Unconscious processing of a simple 
luminance stimulus appearance seems to be possible without late processing in V1 
whereas unconscious processing of motion and chromaticity depends on V1 in both 
early and late time-windows.  
3.2 What explains blindsight? 
Based on our studies, I conclude that unconscious visual processing depends on V1 
in the neurologically healthy, but blindsight patients can sometimes process visual 
stimuli without V1. Blindsight seems to be the solid evidence that unconscious 
processing does not rely on V1. However, it is important to note that not all patients 
with V1 lesion show blindsight; in fact, it is a rather rare phenomenon (Marzi et al., 
1986). So, the question is why these rare cases are able to process visual stimuli 
despite V1 lesion when other patients are not. There are three major explanations for 
this dissociation. First, blindsight can be explained by neural plasticity after lesion. 
New connections form and existing connections change their functions in the 
patients’ brain after V1 lesion (Ajina et al., 2015; Leh et al., 2006; Mikellidou et al., 
2017; Payne & Lomber, 2001). Second, the patients lack geniculo-striate input and 
therefore might become more sensitive to V1-bypassing signals. Because the only 
input from the blind field comes from the subcortical pathways, such as the 
retinotectal tract, the blindsight patients have learned to attend to this information 
and to make the most of the residual visual signals. Third, TMS of V1 might have 
disturbed the activation of subsequent visual areas (V2 or even V3) and those areas 
might be involved in blindsight. However, most of the studies that explicitly express 
the extrastriate areas that are assumed to be part of the pathways behind blindsight 
do not mention V2 or V3. The most common hypothesis is that the connections go 
from the LGN (Ajina & Bridge, 2018, 2019; Ajina et al., 2015) or SC (Barbur, 
Watson, Frackowiak, & Zeki, 1993; Tamietto et al., 2010) to V5, an area that is not 
affected by the TMS of early visual cortex. 
 In my view, the findings of blindsight studies do not contradict my conclusions. 
If unconscious processing was truly V1 independent, we should find blindsight in 
nearly all patients with specific V1 lesion. However, this is not the case. Blindsight 
has been a great inspiration to study V1-independent unconscious processing; 
however, it is likely that blindsight patients’ brains work very differently in 
unconscious processing than neurologically heathy participants’ brains. I would 
assume that the processing is more similar between neurologically healthy 
participants and patients without blindsight than between neurologically healthy 
participants and blindsight patients. 
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3.3 Explaining the studies that have found TMS-
induced blindsight 
There are the studies that have found unconscious processing when the stimulus was 
suppressed using TMS of V1. How can this seemingly contradicting evidence be 
interpreted? The one clear difference between these studies and the three studies 
presented in this thesis is the definition of unconscious processing. Ro and his lab 
(Koenig & Ro, 2018; Persuh & Ro, 2013; Ro, 2008; Ro et al., 2004) use a two-point 
scale (saw/did not see) for visual awareness and their awareness question is often 
ambiguous, for example, “did you see the line” when the task is to report the 
orientation of the line. Participants can interpret the question as “did you see the line 
well enough that you can tell the orientation quite confidently” or “did you see 
anything at all” or anything between those options. In Boyer, Harrison, and Ro’s 
(2005) study, the participants were even explicitly asked whether they saw the 
orientation of the line; thus, the participant might have some kind of visual 
perception but they could not identify the task-relevant features. The suppression 
was also incomplete in the studies that found affective blindsight (Filmer & Monsell, 
2013; Jolij & Lamme, 2005). The studies interfered only with the task-relevant 
features of the stimuli, but the participants were not unaware of the stimuli. The 
studies that have two-point awareness rating typically overestimate the number of 
unconscious trials, if the participants have conservative response criterion in the 
seen-unseen evaluation (Lloyd, Abrahamyan, & Harris, 2013). In our Studies I and 
II, we suppressed the perception of the stimulus and denoted only the trials in which 
participants were confident that no stimulus was presented as “unconscious.” In 
Study III, we asked participants to report only the number of chromatic stimuli; 
therefore, we cannot be sure if they saw something in the suppressed visual field but 
just not the chromatic stimulus. Most likely, the perception of the entire stimulus was 
suppressed in Study III as well and even if there was some residual vision, the 
participants were certain that there was no redundant chromatic stimulus. One might 
say that we and Ro’s lab are measuring two different things. They are measuring 
something that is more like TMS-induced Type 2 blindsight and we are measuring 
TMS-induced Type 1 blindsight. Both camps seem pretty confident that their 
approach is the correct one, and there is likely some truth in both approaches. This 
discussion reminds me about Tim Minchin’s (2013) speech at the graduation 
ceremony of the University of Western Australia: “We tend to generate false 
dichotomies and then try to argue one point using two entirely different sets of 
assumptions. Like two tennis players trying to win a match by hitting beautifully 
executed shots from either end of separate tennis courts.” Of course, I argue that our 
approach better reflects the phenomenon. In my opinion, you are not blind as in 
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blindsight if you have a visual perception but just cannot detect the task-relevant 
feature.  
 Another way of misinterpreting unconscious visual processing to be independent 
of V1 contribution is to make the task so difficult that even baseline (without TMS) 
detection probability accuracy is low. That is the case in Allen, Sumner, and 
Chamber’s (2014) study, wherein they concluded that V1 interferes with conscious 
perception but not with unconscious processing. Their task was calibrated such that 
in baseline, the participants detected the stimulus in half of the trials; therefore, there 
were many unconscious trials even without TMS of V1. Accuracy slightly decreased 
when V1 was stimulated, but it had little effect on unconscious processing, which 
they interpreted as TMS-induced blindsight. The problem here is that TMS of V1 
did not cause suppression in most of the trials; in fact, it might be that TMS did not 
have any effect in most of the trials. Most of their trials therefore likely reflect near-
threshold vision rather than TMS-induced blindsight.  
3.4 Critical remarks 
Even though our studies are methodologically sound and the results support the 
conclusions, some aspects might affect the generalizability of the conclusions. A 
common fact across the studies is the variance in the strength of TMS suppression. 
There were participants whose conscious perception was not much disturbed by 
TMS of V1. Some of this can be explained by anatomical differences: if V1 is located 
further away from the skull, stimulating it is more difficult. More interestingly, the 
participants have different SOAs in which the suppression is most effective. Some 
participants’ conscious perception can be easily suppressed using 60 ms SOA but 
not very effectively with 90 ms SOA and vice versa. There could be individual 
differences in the timing of the feedforward sweep; therefore, the timing of TMS 
SOAs may be off. This issue can be resolved by obtaining the event-related 
potentials (ERP) of the visual stimulus and determining the feedforward time-
window based on the earliest signals that reach the visual cortex. If the timing of the 
feedforward sweep is not the explaining factor, then the question is why feedforward 
TMS suppresses some participants’ perception more effectively than feedback TMS 
and vice versa for other participants’ perception. 
 In Study I, my greatest critique is that the results are at odds with the assumption 
that feedforward activation was disturbed at 60 ms SOA: overall, the strength of the 
suppression of conscious vision was not as high at 60 ms SOA as it was at 90 ms 
SOA. If the TMS of V1 at 60 ms SOA suppresses the feedforward sweep, we should 
observe more effective suppression at 60 ms SOA. Unconscious RTE varied 
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considerably between participants at 60 ms SOA whereas at 90 ms SOA, we 
observed consistent positive unconscious RTE across almost all participants.  
 Study II was quite challenging to execute because of technical limitations. The 
suppressive effect of TMS is brief; therefore, the stimulus duration should be 
minimized. The visual field that TMS of V1 using figure-of-eight coil disrupts is 
also spatially quite small; thus, the stimulus must be small and its motion is limited. 
In blindsight studies, the stimuli can be large and the motion can be extensive 
because the patients have larger scotomas in their visual field. We could not find the 
unconscious processing of motion without V1 probably owing to the small size or 
slow speed of the stimuli, whereas with larger stimuli or faster motion, unconscious 
processing might be found. 
 In Study III, the timing of TMS could have played a critical role. The processing 
of the color might take longer time than processing of achromatic stimuli in V1 and 
therefore we could have actually suppressed feedforward information at 90 ms SOA. 
We could have included longer SOAs to test this possibility. However, the study 
demonstrated that the unconscious processing of color is not independent of V1. At 
least some processing phase in V1 is needed for the unconscious processing of color.  
3.5 Conclusions and future directions 
Based on our findings and previous studies, I argue that unconscious visual 
processing depends on V1 in the neurologically healthy. By unconscious, I mean the 
stimuli that are completely suppressed by TMS of V1. In cases wherein the 
participant sees something but not the task-relevant features of the stimulus, 
unconscious processing might occur. But in these cases, a stronger TMS pulse could 
have eliminated the conscious perception of the whole stimulus and also eliminated 
unconscious processing. Therefore, the conclusion that unconscious processing does 
not depend on V1 is misleading. There might be some features of conscious 
perception that can be suppressed by TMS of V1 whilst unconscious processing is 
left intact. However, this does not mean that unconscious processing does not depend 
on V1, but instead it implies that conscious processing is easier to suppress than 
unconscious processing. In most cases, V1 contributes to unconscious processing in 
feedforward and early recurrent time-windows, but the results of Study I showed that 
very elementary stimuli can be unconsciously processed if the feedforward 
activation from V1 is not disturbed.  
 In future studies, a few areas in this field need further investigation. One 
difference between our studies and those by Ro’s lab (they have reported TMS-
induced blindsight) that might be worth further investigation is the role of the 
stimulus location in the visual field. While Ro’s lab has used mostly foveal stimuli, 
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we have been studying peripheral vision. It would be interesting to study V1-
independent unconscious processing with stimuli presented into fovea, in contrast to 
peripheral vision, using a four-point perceptual awareness scale. In other words, the 
TMS-induced blindsight studies would be replicated such that participants can 
choose awareness ratings that better reflect their subjective experience. 
Simultaneously, whether the difference is in fact attributable to the location of the 
stimulus in the visual field would be tested. Another possible future direction is to 
concentrate on the tasks that are even more action-based or include emotional 
content. In our studies, we have used speed response to reflect action to stimulus, but 
more direct and concrete methods are available. Pointing, reaching, and touching 
actions as well as saccadic eye movements could be used to indicate the location of 
the stimulus. Perhaps these visuomotor systems are even more automatic and can 
reveal unconscious processing more easily than our paradigm. Finally, I would 
suggest that instead of single pulses, studies should employ burst TMS, which 
includes a few consecutive pulses within a certain interval. Using burst, it would be 
possible to disturb activation in the brain for a longer interval and therefore interfere 
with both feedforward and feedback activity in a single trial. This would be a more 
analogous situation to blindsight because all the processing in V1 would be 
interfered with. 
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Abbreviations 
fMRI Functional magnetic resonance imaging 
GNW Global neuronal workspace model 
LGN Lateral geniculate nucleus 
RTE Redundant target effect 
SC Superior colliculus 
TMS Transcranial magnetic stimulation 
V1 Primary visual cortex 
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